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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the Institute of Medicine’s landmark 1999 report on medical errors, mandates, legislation, 
and recommendations have been forced on the U.S. healthcare industry. However, only limited 
progress has been made. Part of the difficulty is identifying the scope of the problem, which has 
been far larger than thought since the advent of new reporting tools. The major causes of medical 
errors lie in the lack of a (a) pervasive safety culture, (b) commitment by top healthcare 
organization management to reduce medical errors, and (c) integrated IT systems, including 
electronic health records. Compared to other “high reliability” organizations that have achieved 
excellent results in regard to safety, healthcare is perceived as lagging far behind. Healthcare is 
not the sole industry needing a safety culture. However, many healthcare leaders perceive existing 
industry tools that high reliability organizations routinely use as irrelevant.  Positive change will 
come when attitudes change and healthcare organizations embrace the solutions that other 
industrial organizations have utilized to produce satisfactory safety outcomes. 
 
Keywords: Medical Errors; Healthcare Organizations; Electronic Health Records; Quality 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n 1999 the Institute of medicine (IOM) reported that at least 44,000 individuals and perhaps as many as 
98,000 die in hospitals annually because of medical errors (Institute of Medicine, 1999). The Quality of 
Health Care in America Committee responsible for conducting the study at the IOM did not suggest this 
situation was due to recklessness or actions of any particular group but rather that faulty systems, processes, and 
conditions make such errors much more prone to occur. The report results generated immediate action by the 
Clinton administration and the U.S. Congress, including instructions to agencies that oversee healthcare programs to 
implement strategies for reducing medical errors. The action plan at the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ) comprised developing and testing new technologies, instituting large-scale demonstration projects 
to test safety interventions and error-reporting strategies, establishing multidisciplinary and geographically diverse 
research teams, and conducting studies to analyze environmental and educational issues. 
 
 Five years after the IOM report, a report from the Commonwealth Fund stated that “notable advances had 
been made” but considerable barriers remained—for example, how medical errors are quantified (Bleich, 2005). 
This made the 2004 IOM’s goal of a 50% reduction in errors by 2004 almost irrelevant because the rate was 
impossible to determine with any accuracy. Further legislation, including the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 
2006, and Quality Assessment and Performance Improvement (QAPI) programs mandated by federal regulation as a 
condition of Medicare and Medicaid participation then spurred healthcare organizations to report on both adverse 
events, defined as harm to a patient as a result of medical care, and “never” events, described as serious events that 
should never occur in a healthcare setting. Consequently, by October 2008, the Office of the Inspector General, 
Department of Health and Human Services was able to conduct a study that unearthed the following disturbing 
findings (Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, 2010): 
 
 
I 
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 About 14% of Medicare beneficiaries experienced an adverse event while in a hospital 
 During their hospital stay, an additional 14% of Medicare beneficiaries experienced events that resulted in 
temporary harm  
 Of these events, physician reviewers determined that 44% were preventable and 51% not preventable 
 Costs associated with these events totaled $137 million, just for the month of October. 
 
In 2009, a new resource—the Global Trigger Tool—became available to further help researchers quantify 
patient safety (Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2009). Use of the tool produced startling results. For example, 
evaluation of three leading hospitals by this tool and two others demonstrated that adverse event detection methods 
regularly used to track patient safety in the USA—voluntary reporting and the AHRQ’s Patient Safety Indicators—
missed 90% of adverse events (Classen et al., 2011). In these hospitals one third of all admissions were associated 
with an adverse event. Most damning of all were the authors conclusions: “Reliance on such methods could produce 
misleading conclusions about safety in the US health care system and could misdirect patient safety improvement 
efforts” (Classen et al., 2011, p.6). Employing a weighted average of four studies that utilized the Global Trigger 
Tool, James (2013) determined that a lower limit of 210,000 deaths per year was associated with preventable harm 
events in hospitals with the true number of premature deaths at more than 400,000 per year. Perhaps just as 
staggering was that serious harm occurred at a rate of 10-20 times that of lethal harm. 
 
Clearly, healthcare in the United States has a problem; understanding why the problem is of such a 
magnitude is the goal of the rest of this review. 
 
WHY HAS PROGRESS BEEN SO LIMITED? 
 
 Is hospital care a special case? Many industries outside of healthcare have demonstrated remarkable safety 
records based on characteristics and behaviors that create conditions for exemplary performance and “high 
reliability” (Reason, 1997; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Therefore, Chassin and Loeb (2013) argued that it might be 
possible to translate principles operating in high-reliability organizations as defined by Weick and Sutcliffe to 
healthcare organizations. These principles include preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise. However, Chassin and Loeb found that the 
methods that high-reliability organizations currently use cannot be directly applied to healthcare organizations. 
Instead, they suggested that a series of incremental changes must occur based on leadership’s commitment to 
achieve zero harm to the patient, a fully functional culture safety inculcated throughout the organization, and 
widespread deployment of highly effective process tools. 
 
  Leadership commitment to zero patient harm by hospital boards and CEOs with physicians routinely 
directing clinical quality improvement activities is critical. If this commitment is not the number one priority and has 
to compete with other priorities, it is difficult to imagine that high reliability will emerge as a resolution. This 
concept is supported by studies reporting on negative safety cultures and patient injuries, deaths, and medical errors 
(Institute of Medicine, 2004; Muething et al., 2012; Ormsby, 2013; McFadden, Stock, & Gowen III, 2014; Taylor, 
Dominici, Agnew, Gerwin, Morlock, & Miller; 2012), with Ormsby (2013) further noting that alignment of patient 
and worker safety improvement initiatives is necessary for optimal outcomes, efficiencies, and the development of 
organizational cultures of safety. The research model compiled by McFadden et al. (2014) from 204 hospitals and 
supplemented with objective outcome data from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) in particular provided 
empirical evidence that a safety climate connected to the CEO’s transformational leadership style was related to 
continuous quality improvement (CQI) and improved process quality. However, the authors also noted that CQI 
initiatives are also related to higher hospital-acquired condition rates, a patient safety measurement. While the safety 
climate is correlated to improved patient safety outcomes, most importantly, the authors concluded that patient 
safety climate and CQI initiatives are not interchangeable or universally beneficial. This is a really crucial point; 
CQI does not lead to an improved patient safety climate alone. 
 
 Chassin and Loeb also discuss the vital requirement that health information technology (IT) must be 
coordinated and integrated. Results of leading hospitals implementing comprehensive electronic health record 
(EHR) systems have been positive because of strong leadership, full involvement of clinical staff in design and 
implementation, mandatory staff training, and strict adherence to timelines and budgets (Silow-Carroll, Edwards, & 
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Rodin, 2012). But most of all, successes were achieved because of coordination and integration. In contrast, when 
this does not happen, the result is a colossal failure, as has occurred in Veterans Affairs (VA) Hospitals (Buckley, 
2013). Additionally, IT technologies must be easy to use and useful in terms of improving job performance, 
efficiency, and/or quality (Karsh, 2004). Karsh also indicates that such technology must be used in the manner 
intended and provide satisfaction by users, which can be achieved via pilot testing at selected locations with a person 
responsible and accountable for success of the implementation. Mandl and Kohane (2012) also suggest that one of 
the reasons most end users have had such a hard time is that commercially available EHR systems lack flexibility, 
interoperability, and easy-to-use tools; are vastly overpriced; and are poorly supported in both initial installations 
and ongoing change. 
 
 The development of a fully functioning safety culture occurs in stages, and includes five important aspects: 
trust, accountability, identifying unsafe conditions, strengthening systems, and assessment (Chassin & Loeb, 2013). 
Although far from being aligned with these aspects, the most current AHRQ assessment indicates that teamwork 
within units (a measure of trust), supervisor/manager expectations and action promoting patient safety (elements of 
unsafe conditions, strengthening systems, and assessment), and organizational learning (part of unsafe conditions) 
have all improved, with 81, 76, and 73% of responses positive (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2014). 
This is an improvement but Chassin and Loeb’s detailed assessments show there is still a long way to go. However, 
the AHRQ’s nonpunitive response to error measure, which relates to the accountability element, shows that 56% of 
responses are negative; this indicates that accountability is still likely to be a major issue in most U.S. hospitals. 
 
 Strength and resilience of safety systems is another factor listed by Chassin and Loeb. Currently, most 
hospitals react to medical errors—conducting root cause analyses and instituting corrective action to prevent such 
occurrences. However, hospitals need to move to a state of proactive assessment, constantly examining current 
safety systems and reducing risk, and allowing reporting of adverse events without sanctions against participants 
who might not otherwise report such events. Integrated assessment of adverse events is important so that weaknesses 
in systems can be identified. Illustrative of the current situation, the state of Minnesota requires that hospitals and 
ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs) submit adverse event reports to the state health department, which compiles 
events into an annual report and recommendations for improvement (DeJohn, 2013). Within 15 days, each adverse 
event must be reported followed by development of an action plan that the facility has to assess within a further 30-
90 days in terms of its success. This entire process can be seen as reactive (and forced upon the participating 
entities) rather than proactive at the level of the hospital or ASC. Obviously, this is the first stage of a long series of 
changes, but at some point the transition to entity-based, strong, resilient safety systems must begin.  
 
 Last, robust improvement must be initiated. Chassin and Loeb identify three elements in this process: (1) 
lean: tools and a philosophy based on employee-empowered improvement to identify and remove wasted effort 
without compromising the quality of outcomes; (2) six sigma: tools for continually improving process outcomes that 
will dramatically reduce the frequency of defective products or outcomes; and (3) change management, a process 
that prepares organizations to accept, implement, and sustain the application of lean and six sigma tools that will 
improve processes—not just a case of paying “lip service.” At present, most hospitals and healthcare organizations 
do not identify with other industries, which have used these tools for many decades to develop best practices and 
improve their operations. This must change; using the excuse that healthcare organizations are special exempt cases 
is a fallacy. 
 
 Healthcare organization worker fatigue also has been identified as an issue that could be linked to patient 
outcomes and in 2003 the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) mandated that all US 
residency programs limit work hours for trainees (Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, 2003). 
Only a few studies have examined whether these changes helped patient outcomes. One example is the study of 
Salim et al. (2007), who compared death and complication rates for adult trauma patients admitted before the 
changes (an 80-hour work week) during 2001-2003 versus rates after the changes (2004-2006) at an academic level 
1 trauma center. Surprisingly, while there was no change in fatalities, there was a statistically significant increase in 
total, preventable, and nonpreventable complications that was unexplained. At the behest of Congress, the IOM 
embarked on a year-long examination of the evidence available regarding physician sleep, clinical performance 
deficits, and medical errors. The report recommended new limits on resident duty hours and workload, increased 
supervision, more focus on resident physician safety, and training in structured handovers and quality improvement, 
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amongst other things (Institute of Medicine, 2008). While the ACGME issued new rules that went into effect on July 
1, 2011, they fell far short of the IOM’s recommendations, including a restriction that the maximum shift length of 
16 hours only be applied to first-year residents. In response to the new ACGME rules, a comprehensive paper whose 
focus was implementation of the IOM’s recommendations was published in the same year (Blum, Shea, Czeisler, 
Landigran, & Leape, 2011). While the recommendations of Blum et al. (2011) are lengthy, there are a few extremely 
salient points: 
 
 Adjust resident physician workload requirement to optimize educational value 
 Train both resident and attending physicians in effective teamwork 
 Always have good, supervising physicians for residents assigned to critically ill patients 
 Limit resident physician work hours to 12-16 hours per shift with a minimum of 10 hours off duty between 
shifts 
 Hospitals should adhere to principles of sleep and circadian science in regard to schedules 
 Training in fatigue recognition for residents with assistance by the hospital for transportation to and from 
home if needed 
 More effective training in handing over of care, in a team setting if possible, and integration of handovers 
into EHRs 
 External oversight of ACGME by CMS and the Joint Commission 
 
It is not known with any certainty if the newest rules are affecting patient safety yet. While most of 
theACGME rule changes affected residents, it is also clear that surgeons operating in the United States also have 
problems. Authors of a cross-sectional survey of 7,905 surgeons in 2008 using standardized instruments for burnout 
and quality of life (QOL) found that 9% of surgeons had made a major medical error in the past 3 months, with 70% 
of these surgeons indicating it was attributable to individual factors (Shanafelt et al., 2009). Commitment of medical 
errors was strongly associated with mental QOL, especially depression and burnout. While it is known that stress 
and fatigue are associated with medical errors, this is one area that needs much more focus in the future. 
 
Other factors identified in a study between 2000 and 2004 utilizing MEDMARX, an anonymous, 
confidential, de-identified, Internet-accessible medication error-reporting program, included ER errors that occurred 
in the administrative phase of the medication process with peak error rates on Mondays and during the evening shift 
(Pham et al., 2011). The authors noted common factors of distraction, emergency situations, and workload increases. 
Ultimately, understaffing, inexperienced staff, and overcrowding contribute heavily as causes. 
 
STRATEGIES AND TOOLS THAT COULD HELP FURTHER IMPROVEMENT 
 
 A recent national (U.S.) estimate of the direct costs associated with medical errors at hospitals suggests it 
was over $1 billion in 2009, but this is likely a considerable underestimate as repeat injuries, certain kinds of injury, 
visits associated with excessively high costs (>$300,000), costs associated with follow-up visits, and litigations costs 
were excluded (David, Gunnarsson, Waters, Horblyuk, & Kaplan, 2013). Thus, the true costs of medical errors 
could be vastly more than estimated. 
 
 Another reason why the costs of medical errors remain uncertain is that they are under-reported. Perez et al. 
(2014) suggest that in part this is because of intrapersonal, interpersonal, institutional, and societal barriers to 
transparency and error disclosure. Most importantly, physicians face recriminations from “patients, lawyers, 
hospital-employers, insurance companies, and their own conscience, along with the threats of incurring legal and 
financial penalties” (Perez et al., 2014, p.49). Thus, to obtain better estimates of reporting, the “blame” culture 
embedded in many healthcare facilities has to be modified, and hospital workers must be willing to step up to the 
plate and report when something goes awry, even if it is not obvious that a medical error has occurred. 
 
There is no doubt that in the right hands the Global Trigger Tool can help the medical community to better 
quantify errors and identify sources of error. For example, the Adventist Health system in a review of 17,295 patient 
records found that adverse events clustered as medication-related glycemic events; medication-related delirium; 
confusion, or oversedation related to analgesics, sedatives, and muscle relaxants; pressure ulcers; medication-related 
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bleeding; and medication-related skin/mucosal reaction/itching (Garrett Jr., et al., 2013). This enabled Adventist to 
focus on systemwide collaborative projects to improve glycemic and pressure ulcer management.  
 
The initiative conducted by Muething et al. (2012) at the Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center is 
illustrative as it built on three strategic plans confirming quality as a core business strategy since 2001. The 
multidisciplinary team-based 2006 safety initiative supported by hospital leaders focused on error prevention; 
restructuring safety governance; a new root cause analysis process and a common cause database; and specific 
tactical interventions for high-risk areas. Serious safety events were reduced by two thirds and after encountered 
difficulties in the first year, patient safety culture outcomes improved between 2007 and 2009. 
 
 Computer provider order entry (CPOE) systems were originally promoted by the IOM as a means of 
reducing medication errors and patient harm (Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, 2001). Researchers 
recently estimated the effect of CPOE on medication errors using random effects meta-analysis in a systematic 
review context and combined the results with data from the 2006 American Society of Health-System Pharmacists 
Annual Survey, and the society’s 2008 Electronic Health Record Adoption Database (Radley, Wasserman, Olsho, 
Shoemaker, Spranca, & Bradshaw, 2013). The results indicated that CPOE systems could reduce the likelihood of 
prescription errors by 48% with a 12.5% reduction of medical errors in 2008, translating to a national 17.4 million 
medication errors averted. 
 
 Placing orders in the wrong patient’s electronic medical record is another factor causing medical errors, and 
was found in a recent investigation to be the second most common cause of care being provided to the wrong 
patient, responsible for 24% of reported errors (Hyman, Laire, Redmond, & Kaplan, 2012). Fifteen months after 
instituting an order verification screen with a patient’s photo centrally placed within the screen, no unintended care 
errors resulted when the photo was present. This simple strategy appears to be highly effective. 
 
 Finally, in the era of Universal Protocol introduced by the Joint Commission in 2004, a study was 
conducted to determine the frequency, root causes, and outcomes of wrong site and wrong patient procedures 
(Stahel et al., 2010). During 2002 through 2008, 25 wrong-patient and 107 wrong-site procedures were identified 
out of 27,370 physician self-reported adverse occurrences. In 20% and 36%, respectively, of these procedures, 
significant patient harm occurred. Errors in diagnosis and errors in communication were responsible for wrong-
patient procedures while errors in judgment and lack of performing a “time-out” (a moment prior to surgery in the 
operating room in which staff checks that everything is in order, including right patient, right site, and right surgery) 
were the primary causes of wrong-site procedures. While at some health care facilities implementation of the 
Universal Protocol clearly needs improvement, the protocol itself has been judged flawed because “it fails to 
account for the complexities of the surgical process and all the different ways in which risks of a wrong-site 
procedure may be introduced into it” (Chassin and Loeb, 2013, p.463). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In the last 15 years progress in managing medical errors has been limited. Part of the problem emanates 
from the nature of the systems used to identify such errors. However, newer systems seem to fair better in this 
respect. While there are bright spots in particular healthcare facilities within the United States, the changes needed to 
make healthcare systems into high-reliability organizations have a long way to go. Moreover, IT systems for 
healthcare organizations are far more expensive than they should be and frequently lack integration. Bowman (2013) 
elegantly captured some of the issues with electronic health records by stating “Designed and used inappropriately, 
EHRs add a layer of complexity to the already complex delivery of healthcare, leading to unintended adverse 
consequences such as dosing errors, failure to detect serious illnesses, and delays in treatment due to poor human-
computer interactions or loss of data” (p.9). In summary, therefore, healthcare organizational leaders are just 
beginning to face a long series of perhaps painful transitions that will be needed to arrive at the level of most 
industrial organizations in respect to safety. 
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